The Battles in Flanders, from Ypres to Neuve Chapelle — Inside the Classic

Such were broadly the issues which at the beginning of October last hung in the balance. Every appearance seemed to favour the German chances. General Joffre was then raising yet another (the tenth) French army. Even, however, at the utmost speed it could not be organised and equipped under a further fortnight. The Germans, however, had on their side begun their movement. Through the wide gap between Ghent and Bethune they were already pouring a great mass of cavalry, screening the oncoming of their main masses. They had launched their final assault upon Antwerp. It looked as if for them the moment had arrived.

HOW THE CRISIS WAS MET

General Joffre is a great man. So much is known now to all the world. But this war was not a month old before every military man was aware that the head of the French Staff, a galaxy of brilliant men, was a star of the first magnitude.

The greatness of Joffre as a general lies not so much in his simplicity, about which many stories are told, nor yet in his strength of character, his incorruptible honesty, or his unshakable fortitude. It lies in the force of his intellect which, joined to his character, makes his judgment unerring. He is marked off because he foresees, and foresees truly. It has been stated that his plans for the Battle of the Marne were drawn up and completed on August 27. Quite possibly they were. The movement which then substituted the Sixth French Army, that of General D'Armade, for the British on the extreme left of the Allied line, argues a clearly settled purpose and plan.

All the movements just stated in the briefest outline were parts of a settled purpose and plan. Is it likely that, the situation being what it was at the beginning of October, General Joffre was at a loss to meet it? He was not at a loss. At least he was not at a loss for ideas. The difficulty was the means.

Three French armies were already fastened on the flank of the German position. To fill the gap between Bethune and the coast it was essential to find three others, and at once. He had only one.

Time here was everything. Ever since the Germans had grasped the necessity of re-seizing the initiative at all costs, it had been a race against time. Their military railways and their organisation, carefully elaborated through years to meet just such a contingency as this, was pitted against the resources of a great military genius. It was the brain of one man against a system.

And the man won and the system lost.

To any ordinary mind it might have appeared that the situation of the Allies in that first week of October was well-nigh hopeless. To a great mind, however, difficulty is the measure of opportunity. General Joffre visited Sir John French at the British head-quarters. The result of that interview is stated by Sir John French in his dispatch of November 20:

Early in October a study of the general situation strongly impressed me with the necessity of bringing the greatest possible force to bear in support of the northern flank of the Allies, in order effectively to outflank the enemy and compel him to evacuate his positions.

At the same time the position on the Aisne, as described in the concluding paragraphs of my last despatch, appeared to me to warrant a withdrawal of the British Forces from the positions they then held.

The enemy had been weakened by continual abortive and futile attacks, while the fortification of the position had been much improved.

I represented these views to General Joffre, who fully agreed.

Arrangements for withdrawal and relief having been made by the French General Staff, the operation commenced on October 3, and the 2nd Cavalry Division, under General Gough, marched for Compiègne en route for the new theatre.

The Army Corps followed in succession at intervals of a few days, and the move was completed on October 19, when the First Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, completed its detrainment at St. Omer.

That this delicate operation was carried out so successfully is in great measure due to the excellent feeling which exists between the French and British Armies; and I am deeply indebted to the Commander-in-Chief and the French General Staff for their cordial and most effective co-operation.

In a word, the British Commander-in-Chief, seizing the nature of the difficulty, knowing its causes, and realising how much turned upon it, stepped forthwith into the breach. With Sir John French, as with General Joffre, to decide was to act. "Early in October" the decision was taken. On October 3 began the carrying of it out. What difference in time is there between "early in October" and October 3? No difference.

Thus while the Germans still imagined themselves opposed on the Aisne ridge to those British troops who, dug into their almost invisible entrenchments, had for nearly a month successfully withstood the repeated and furious attacks of the flower of the Prussian Army twice or more than twice as numerous as themselves, the British had silently ebbed away. Their places were taken by French troops of the reserve, and the Germans remained no wiser for the change. And the British travelled through Paris, and by roundabout routes, as it seemed to them, through north-west France, and very few remained wiser for their journey. Nor after long successive hours in crowded railway carriages followed by detrainment at a place altogether strange did any but a very few of the British even know where they were going to or for what purpose. All they knew was that they were going somewhere to meet the Germans.

No move in the campaign was more unexpected or more daring than this. It affords but one more proof of how false is the assumption that the element of surprise has been banished from modern war.

The secrecy of it was only less remarkable than its boldness. With an Intelligence Service supposed to be second to none, the German Staff were left without even a suspicion of it until it had been accomplished.

The importance of the move was that it made General Joffre's scheme for the military envelopment of the Germans immediately feasible. There was now but one more thing to do, and that was to withdraw the Belgian army from Antwerp in order that they should complete the Allied line.

That it is true involved the evacuation of Antwerp. Quite apart from the fact that the Belgian Army, reduced by the casualties and the hardships of their heroic campaign, were no longer sufficient in numbers properly to garrison that great fortress, their withdrawal served a purpose more valuable even than its defence. Many no doubt are much more readily impressed by the evacuation for the time of a great fortified city than by what they consider a mere military scheme, the value of which is a matter of opinion. In this instance, however, the carrying out of the scheme meant the assurance of victory in the war. The evacuation of Antwerp was advisable on the principle that the greater comprehends the less.

After the transfer of the British forces from the Aisne, and the removal on October 8 and 9 of the Belgian troops from Antwerp to the Yser, there were on the German flank from Noyon to the sea six Allied armies. Taking them in the order of position from south to north they were: the army of General Castleneau; the army of General D'Armade; the army of General D'Urbal; the army of Sir J. French; the army of General Maudhuy; and the army of King Albert.

Let it be remembered that in addition to the twenty-eight army corps of the German Expeditionary force as at first constituted, there were at this time either in or on their way to France twenty-one Reserve and Volunteer Corps, making the enormous total of forty-nine. That, independently of casualties and wastage, gives, on the German war footing, an aggregate of 2,940,000 of all arms. Undoubtedly the casualties and wastage had even up to this time been very heavy. It is reasonable and moderate to put it roundly at nearly 900,000 men, two-thirds of those losses being casualties in battle. Even that, however, left approximately 2,000,000 combatants. Besides, the casualties and wastages had been largely made good by fresh drafts.

When we bear in mind the vital consequence to Germany of the plan for re-seizing the initiative which the German Staff were endeavouring to carry out, there is nothing in the least surprising in their hurrying into France reinforcements and drafts of such magnitude.

The position in brief was that the total German force in France had been brought up to at least a million men above the immense, and as it was supposed crushing, strength of the initial Expeditionary Force, and that, too, despite the losses incurred.

Many of the facts relating to this war are so wholly without parallel that not a few people, unaware of the true vastness and menace of the military system of modern Germany, find it hard to give them credence. As nearly as possible, however, the figures of the forces sent from Germany into Belgium and France will be found to be these:

Original Expeditionary Force (25 Active and 3 Reserve Corps) 1,680,000

Fresh drafts to supply losses (approximately) 450,000

Additional Reserve Corps 1,260,000 --------- Total 3,390,000

The problem of dealing with such a force, and of dealing with it when the total strength that could on the side of the Allies then be put into the field against it was in round figures a million less, is a problem quite unlike anything in war since in 1814 Napoleon fought the memorable campaign which preceded his abdication and exile to Elba.[1]

[1] This statement is based on the following facts which at this date (the beginning of October) summarises the then immediately prospective situation as regards numbers:--

Total German forces sent into or about to be sent into France and Belgium 3,390,000 Less casualties and wastage approximately 900,000 --------- Net German forces 2,490,000

Allies:-- Nine French armies, reinforced to full strength 1,080,000 10th French army (in formation) 120,000 British (including forces at Ghent) 145,000 Belgians 40,000 --------- 1,385,000 --------- 1,105,000

The disparity of course was afterwards redressed. It took, as it proved, some twenty days before all the additional German forces could be sent West, and on the other hand the embodiment of French Reservists was proceeding at the same time, but the possibility, not to say the probability, that the Germans would get in first, constituted the crisis.

Nobody will venture to say that, having such a superiority in numbers at their command, and occupying besides a strongly fortified line of front, enabling them further to economise their strength in one direction while they threw it with greater weight in another, the Germans were not fully warranted in thinking that the success of their scheme was assured, and that if it was assured, the French having shot their bolt in the Battle of the Marne, and shot it in vain, there was an end to all intents of the struggle on the West.

How was General Joffre to grapple with this vast enigma? By meeting the Germans on traditional lines of tactics? It was impossible. Besides, in the face of modern arms traditional tactics are out of date. They survive only in popular tradition, and in the criticism based upon it.

The only way on the Allied side at once to secure and eventually and fully to reap the advantages won at the Battle of the Marne was to complete and to solidify the military envelopment which would render the whole of this gigantic force of invaders for all the purposes of the invasion impotent. It was plain, too, that the immediate purpose of the Germans was now to straighten out their front across France. If the reader looks at a map he will see that the fortified line held by the enemy from the Argonne to the Aisne, would, if continued to the north-west, touch the French coast near to Havre. With such a straightened front not only would the Germans have the Channel ports in their possession, but they would be free either to advance, if they had the power, or to retreat if they chose. What is more, they would then be able to advance or to retreat as a whole. In such a position it is clear their advance would have enormously greater momentum, and their retreat be an operation of far greater safety. Moreover, their front would be shorter, and in consequence stronger.

When, therefore, I speak of General Joffre's scheme of military envelopment, I mean by it the difference, and it is a vast difference, between the position of the Germans were their front straightened out and their position in an angle. Placed in an angle their armies were for all the purposes of their campaign paralysed, and except to counter-attack, which after all is no more than a defensive tactic, they could do nothing. Besides, in such a situation counter-attack is a necessity. It is an axiom confirmed by all experience that troops in such a situation cannot maintain their position merely by a passive defence.

If from this situation there was for the Germans but one outlet, that of wheeling round their flank until it came into line with the rest of their front, it followed that their pressure would inevitably be greatest on the extremity of the radius, that is on the part of it nearest the coast, and it was manifest that no effort possible would be spared by them to apply that pressure before the line of the Allies here could be formed, or at all events before it could be made firm.

To the British army therefore in this scheme was assigned a post which was at once a post of honour and of danger. Strangely enough some of the greatest and most striking facts in this war appear to have been overlooked. Among them is the fact that this military envelopment, or outflankment, meant to the Germans, if they could not prevent it, both the ruin of their hopes of victory in France, and the certain loss of the war. Clearly then it was to be expected that every ounce of strength and of energy they could command would be put into the struggle.

We can well understand, though the public, perhaps happily, remained in ignorance for the time, the anxiety that prevailed, except it would seem at the head-quarters of the French Staff. There the characteristic calm does not appear to have been disturbed. Following his custom, the French commander-in-chief went usually to bed at nine o'clock, and rose at 5.30, save when duty took him, as it did take him at times, to places in the fighting line. He gave his instructions, knowing that if carried out, as they would be if possible, the result would be right. A mighty worker and the very personification of the commanding quality of decision, he never swerved by a hair's breath from his plan, foreseeing all its consequences and judging justly of its effects.

He judged justly of its effects because he relied upon essentials. On the one hand the Germans had a huge superiority in numbers. They had also at this time a superiority in heavy guns. On the other hand the Allies held the superior position. Further, they had a decisive superiority in field guns; not a numerical superiority, but one based on the greater power and accuracy of the "75" gun as compared with the German converted "77" gun. In 1899 just after the German Government had completed rearmament of its artillery with the "77," the French brought out the "75," the first really practicable quick-firing field gun until then known. This invention revolutionised modern gunnery. To meet it the Germans were forced to "convert" their "77" into a quick-firer. Their gun, however, remained distinctly inferior and out-classed. Neither in muzzle energy, muzzle velocity, nor consequently in range was it any match for the French weapon. Leading the way as they always have done in artillery improvements, the French had evolved, besides, a novel system of "fire discipline," for using this gun scientifically and with the maximum of effect. That system had already justified itself by striking results. In no small degree it was the "75" gun which had crushed the German resistance on the Marne. In no small degree, too, it was the "75" which had ruined the German attack upon Rheims. The "75" had withered the attempted turning movements from Noyon, and north of the Somme with the breath of death. Clearly, apart altogether from its strategical conception, sound and great at once as that conception was, General Joffre's plan of military envelopment was inspired by the aim of giving the widest effect to this superiority in gun-power. Here again is one of the facts of the war which has not been estimated at its right value, and has misled many critics of the Western "deadlock."

Now the German Higher Command well knew that in field artillery they were out-classed. The "75" has a muzzle energy of 333 foot-tons as compared with the 241·7 foot-tons of the German "77." The French artillerists also had solved the problem of the "universal shell," that is of a projectile combining the effects of a high explosive shell with those of a shrapnel shell. With the Germans this problem was still in the stage of experiment. In order to off-set such marked disadvantages the German Government had gone in largely for heavy howitzers. When the war broke out they had undoubtedly a superiority in that class of weapon. The French scheme of rearmament with howitzers had only begun. This was perhaps one reason for the German precipitancy. Upon their superiority in heavy howitzers they now largely relied for their second contemplated "drive."

Artillery, however, is not the final word. Nor was this placing of the British Force on the northern wing of the German armies in any sense an accidental choice of location. It was certain that the German attack, initiated with their heavy cannon, would be driven home, if it could be driven home, by assaults in mass formation from their infantry. The necessity then was for a force which could be relied upon in any event to stop such rushes. That force was pre-eminently the British army. The British army were a body of expert riflemen. They were more. They, and they alone, were armed with a rifle capable of firing 15 rounds "rapid." Delivered by troops who can keep cool under the experience, 15 rounds "rapid" will stop the densest rush ever organised. The British army had shown themselves able to do it. They formed the element of the Allied forces which in a case like this could, if it were humanly possible, save the situation.

It will be seen, therefore, that the scheme of the Allied generals though it seemed to lack spectacular magnificence, was business, and was in every sense and emphatically _war_.

The plan of the Allied commanders, at once original and bold, was decided upon at that conference at the British head-quarters on the Aisne. From the first in this war the French Intelligence Service has shown itself excellent. The French Head-quarters Staff has not only been well and reliably informed of the enemy's preparations and movements, but promptly informed. In this instance the prospective movements were a matter of almost certain inference. Given the motives of the German Government, and the military principles favoured by the German Staff, both quite well known, and what they would do and how they would try to do it, was a conclusion that a general much less sagacious than Joffre might safely draw. The exact extent and character, however, of the German preparations, and the degree to which those preparations had been advanced was definite information of a valuable kind.

It is apposite here to note its effect. On September 9 the Belgians made a sortie in force from Antwerp, and on the following day recaptured Malines and Termonde. In consequence of this part of the German reinforcements, three army corps, which were on the march from Liège and had already reached the French frontier, had to be recalled. That army became engaged in the first attack upon Antwerp. The object, their diversion, had been gained. When, after discovering that an attack upon Antwerp was hopeless without heavy siege guns, they finally reached the front in France, the purpose for which they had been dispatched, that of attempting to outflank the Allies to the west of Noyon, had become impracticable.