The British Interned in Switzerland — Edition Insights

II. CONDITIONS IN SWITZERLAND ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR—THE SWISS ARMY 11

III. PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPATRIATION AND INTERNMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 24

IV. RED CROSS ORGANIZATIONS IN SWITZERLAND—THE BRITISH LEGATION RED CROSS ORGANIZATION 38

V. THE FOUNDATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE "BRITISH SECTION" OF THE "BUREAU DE SECOURS AUX PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE" AT BERNE 54

VI. ARRIVAL IN SWITZERLAND OF THE FIRST CONTINGENT OF BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR FROM GERMANY 72

VII. THE SWISS SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION AND DISCIPLINE RELATIVE TO THE INTERNED PRISONERS OF WAR 83

VIII. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TREATMENT OF THE SICK AND WOUNDED—THE PROVISION OF HOSPITALS AND CLINICS 98

IX. MEDICAL AND SURGICAL TREATMENT OF THE INTERNED—INSPECTION BY LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR R. JONES, R.A.M.C. 119

X. SWISS ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE INTERNED— DIVISION INTO CATEGORIES TO CORRESPOND TO DEGREE OF VALIDITY—TECHNICAL AND EDUCATIONAL INSTRUCTION— WORKSHOPS AND FACTORIES 131

XI. EMPLOYMENT OF THE BRITISH INTERNED—CLASSES AND WORKSHOPS—TECHNICAL TRAINING—SCHEME OF DR. GARNETT 144

XII. THE CHURCHES IN SWITZERLAND IN RELATION TO THE INTERNED— ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE SPIRITUAL WELFARE OF THE BRITISH INTERNED—ESTIMATES OF THE PSYCHICAL STATE OF THE INTERNED 159

XIII. HOMES—VISITS OF RELATIVES—RECREATIONS AND SPORTS OF THE BRITISH INTERNED 174

XIV. BERNE IMPRESSIONS: ARTISTIC, MUSICAL, AND SOCIAL UNDER WAR CONDITIONS 191

B.L.R.C.O. British Legation Red Cross Organization. C.P. of W.C. Central Prisoners of War Committee. B.R.C.S. British Red Cross Society, London. S.B.O. Senior British Officer of the Camp. D.M.O. Directing Medical Officer. P. of W. Prisoners of War. A.S.A. "Armée Sanitäts Anstalt." Military Hospital at Seebourg. T.I.M. "Travail d'Internés Militaires." Workshop for French Interned at Vevey. B.I.T.S. British Interned Technical School at Vevey. C.C.C. Society. The Colonial and Continental Church Society. Y.M.C.A. Young Men's Christian Association. B.I.M. British Interned, Mürren. C.B. Confinement to Barracks. Ps. of W.H.C. Prisoners of War Help Committee. G.H.Q. General Head Quarters. Q.M.G. Quarter-Master General. V.A.D. Voluntary Aid Detachment.

THE BRITISH INTERNED IN SWITZERLAND

Driving off with my daughter and just a couple of portmanteaux to the London Chatham and Dover Railway, on July 16, 1914, _en route_ for Thoune, our usual headquarters when contemplating a few weeks' wandering in Switzerland, I little thought of the events the Fates were weaving, and which, I suppose, have not left unaffected any individual destiny either in Europe or in the whole world. It was a bright and sunny morning, with a light cool breeze, upon which we congratulated ourselves in view of the crossing of that narrow but often uncomfortable strip of sea isolating us from the great continent at hand. Nothing, so far, to warn us of any impending upheaval. The sea was blissfully asleep, enveloped in a golden haze; and Paris as gay, nonchalant, and unsuspecting of any approaching danger, as a child at play.

The papers which reached me, however, on arrival at Thoune, interfered somewhat with the first enjoyment of mountain and lake. I remember watching, one afternoon on the lake, the gathering of a storm over the Interlaken valley, the mists sweeping up the lower slopes of the mountains to unite with the gloomy, threatening clouds above, the whole rent by sudden forked flashes and resonating peals. Was it a counterpart I knew the German Government had long since planned war to hasten and to crown their country's hitherto peaceful economic penetration abroad. Her military writers had treated us to an exposition of the ways and means by which world dominion could be secured; and her diplomats and intellectuals had been at much pains to secretly enlighten their own people as to the meaning of the "Welt-politik" they were so fond of proclaiming. In England, individual lucubrations such as these would, in the natural order of things, be set aside as of no special import; but in Germany, where every class was drilled and schooled to the idea of "Deutschland über alles," did they not foreshadow a national, even racial impulse, gathering force as it developed?

Personally, I had all the less reason for anticipating any sudden upheaval, as I had just assisted in London (February-March, 1914) at a Conference between representatives of British navigation interests and German delegates of the Bagdad Railway Company and the Deutsche Bank, with the object of establishing the relative positions of our respective interests, in so far as the navigation of the Mesopotamian rivers was concerned. Daily, even twice daily, sittings were solemnly carried on, with but one interruption of a week to allow the German delegates to refer to Berlin for further instructions. About the end of February a final understanding was actually reached, and embodied in an Agreement duly initialed previous to ratification. These meetings received a good deal of publicity at the time, and I only refer to them in view of certain features which appear of psycho-historical value, as further revealing German character and mentality.

The members taking part in the proceedings (presided over by a member of the Foreign Office) represented the several interests involved, and in addition Herr v. Kühlmann, then Counsellor of the German Embassy in London, attended as representative of German diplomacy. It was the first time I had met Herr v. Kühlmann, and I had no experience, therefore, of his outlook or mentality. His attitude was curiously interesting and ambiguous. He intervened but seldom in the debates, though, when he did, it was to throw oil on troubled waters and expedite the business on hand, whilst his remarks showed a certain grasp of the questions at issue, which were mostly of a very detailed nature. The general impression he made upon me, however, was one of supreme boredom on his part. His attitude may be described as one of supercilious tolerance and indifference, which puzzled me at the time, but which, in the light of subsequent events, becomes perfectly clear and natural. As an official in the confidence of the German Foreign Office, he was doubtless aware of the intentions of his Government with regard to coming events.

It is now known as an established fact that, at the Imperial Conference summoned at Potsdam, on July 5, 1914, at which representatives of German Diplomacy, the Army and Navy, the great Banks, and well-known captains of industry took part, a final decision was taken in favour of war. Mr. Morgenthau, the American Ambassador at Constantinople, gives an account of this Conference as related to him by Baron Wangenheim, his German colleague; and on the subject of the question of responsibility for the war, writes as follows: "My conclusions as to the 'responsibility' are not based on suspicion or belief or the study of circumstantial data. I do not have to reason or argue about the matter. I know. The conspiracy that caused this greatest of human tragedies was hatched by the Kaiser and his Imperial crew at this Potsdam Conference, on July 5, 1914." Every leader and captain of industry evidently had his orders to be in readiness for war, as the result of the decision of the 5th of July. That Herr v. Kühlmann, like others, had confidential information of what was maturing, admits, I believe, of little doubt; and the negotiations at the Foreign Office for the regulation of so small an affair as the navigation of the Mesopotamian rivers, when compared with the issues of peace and war, must indeed have appeared to him as farcical and particularly boring, given his knowledge of their probable aim and purpose. Just as the departure of the Kaiser on his yacht for Norway after the Potsdam Conference was calculated to give the Chancellories of Europe a feeling of confidence, so the meetings in London must have been calculated to lull our Foreign Office into a sense of security.

The general tension during the last few days of July brought to my mind a conversation I had had with Colonel Trench, our former Military Attaché in Berlin, in the summer of 1912, the memory of which did not serve to minimize my growing uneasiness. I had, at the time, just read works by Bernhardi and Naumann, in which the question of Germany's future is argued in the frankest possible manner; in so frank a manner, indeed, and with so little attempt at concealment, that both authors had been classed by outside critics as hot-heads and fire-brands, in the belief that they, like others of similar tendencies, were unsupported by the more level-headed and responsible leaders of German policy. Some colour was lent to this view by articles appearing simultaneously in the German Press, specially written, as the sequel revealed, for foreign consumption, setting forth that this militant school was led by extremists who should not be taken seriously. Now, Colonel Trench had had unusual opportunities of weighing in the balance the value of the influence exercised by these so-called "extremists." His linguistic accomplishments and attractive personality had made him a _persona grata_ at the German Court, and had given him ample facilities for approaching men of every cast of thought. He had, moreover, seen service in South Africa with the German Expeditionary Force during the Herero campaign, and had thus obtained a near view of the German military machine and German methods of thought.

I, therefore, seized the opportunity of sounding him on the subject of Bernhardi and similar authors, and asked whether they represented in his opinion an extremist, or general, view of thought in Germany. He replied that the views they held were now the common property of all the thinking portion of the community, and even of the great majority of their countrymen, whether articulate or inarticulate. Their very bluntness had led to their being discounted abroad, but none the less Germany practically throughout had been inoculated with the microbe of world-dominion madness and stood solid behind the Military Party. He then added what, at the time, seemed a very bold statement. He said: "You will see that we shall be at war with Germany not later than September, 1914. The Germans have fixed on that date as the most favourable for their purposes. By then their final preparations will be completed, and they cannot or will not wait, for were they to do so they would be giving time to Russia to complete the strategic railways she has in contemplation, and they are determined to forestall her railway programme."

I met Colonel Trench again in the summer of 1913, and referring to our conversation of 1912, adduced arguments then popular in England showing what enormous risks, dynastic as well as economic, the Kaiser would be taking by casting German prosperity into the melting-pot of war; whereas, if left to proceed steadily on her present path, she might achieve world dominion in an economic sense. He brushed aside these arguments on the ground that the German ideal was not based on economic dominion alone, and that such dominion would not satisfy the War Party, who counted on a military success redounding to their credit and that of the Army. He added that every nerve was being strained in anticipation of the "Great Day," and repeated the statement he made in 1912, "that we should be at war with Germany in September, 1914." Was this prophecy to prove correct? It certainly looked like it to any one endeavouring to read between the lines of the news pouring in.

I decided to wire to my wife, who was with Russian relatives, taking the cure at Contréxeville, to hurry on to Switzerland direct. She had just written to say that they proposed making a détour to Switzerland via Colmar and the Black Forest, by automobile. Indeed, as it appeared later, they were about to engage a car, and had actually made all necessary arrangements to that end. Fortunately, my wire arrived just in time, else I fear to face the thought of what might have been the consequences had they been caught in Germany when war was declared about a week later. As it was, my wife and her party arrived safely at Thoune, escaping the French mobilization by a day or two.

On England's declaration of war, I decided to return home at once, and went to Berne to secure passports and, if needful, letters of recommendation. To my great pleasure, I found Sir (then Mr.) Evelyn Grant Duff in charge of the British Legation as H.M.'s Minister to the Swiss Confederation. We had been colleagues many years before (1893-1895), he as Secretary, I as Military Attaché, at the British Legation in Teheran, Persia, where we had worked, and spent several most enjoyable years together. Mr. Grant Duff informed me of his urgent need of a Military Attaché, Colonel Granet, appointed in that capacity to both Italy and Switzerland, being detained in Rome, and so not available at the time at Berne. Mr. Grant Duff proposed wiring, therefore, to ask for my appointment, even if only provisionally. With the glad feeling that I might once more be of service to my country, I accepted his kind offer with the greatest alacrity. The answer to Mr. Grant Duff's telegram arriving a few days later in an affirmative sense, I proceeded to Berne, on August 11, 1914, accompanied by my wife and daughter, to take up my new duties.

When establishing ourselves at the Bernerhof Hôtel, I had little idea it would prove our residence for four consecutive years!

CONDITIONS IN SWITZERLAND ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR —THE SWISS ARMY

On my arrival in Berne, I found an unusual state of affairs. The Minister and members of his Staff were being besieged by thousands of British visitors in Switzerland clamouring to return to England, every one of whom had to be provided with a special permit or passport. The same thing was happening in a minor degree at the American Legation, where the American Minister and his Staff, like ourselves, had to face the question of difficulty of transport through France and across the Channel.

There were some eight thousand British subjects derelict in Switzerland, many of whom, besides, had momentarily exhausted their financial resources. Mobilization was taking place both in France and Switzerland, and the amount of rolling-stock available for through transit was extremely limited, so that it was clear that many of these visitors would have to remain in Switzerland for a certain length of time.

At this juncture, the Swiss hotel proprietors behaved in a very public-spirited manner. The Swiss banks, owing to the financial crisis temporarily supervening, were unable to cash cheques on England, with the result that visitors, willing as they might be, could not, in many cases, settle their hotel accounts before departure. Realizing the situation, the hotel proprietors not only declared their readiness to accept deferred payment, but further offered their British clientèle the use of their hotels for as long as necessary. This attitude on the part of the proprietors at a moment of extreme difficulty not only reflects credit on themselves, but is one on which our national pride may dwell with pleasure, since it makes clear the confidence inspired by the British visitor abroad.

The financial situation was further complicated by the fact that ready money was practically unobtainable, H.M.'s Minister himself being only allowed by his own bank to draw frs. 50 per week. A solution, however, was soon happily found in a provision in the regulations of the Swiss National Bank to the effect "that if gold be deposited at an authorized centre, the Bank might issue notes against such gold." At the request of the Minister, H.M.'s Government deposited £25,000 at the Swiss Bankverein in London, upon which the Swiss National Bank opened an equivalent credit in notes in favour of the Minister at Berne. Mr. Grant Duff was thus enabled to issue cash in exchange for cheques, and so facilitate the return of stranded British visitors.

Mr. G. P. Skipworth, the representative in Berne of the Westinghouse Brake Company, volunteered to undertake the detailed work in connection with this transportation, which, as a matter of fact, lasted over two months. It suffices to say that it was no light matter to assemble parties of three to four hundred visitors scattered all over Switzerland, and to see them safely off to their satisfaction, if not comfort, whenever through conveyance could be placed at their disposal by the Swiss and French authorities.

Mr. Skipworth was, later on, appointed Assistant Commercial Attaché to the British Legation in Switzerland, a post he still happily occupies.

On taking up my duties in Berne, I made the acquaintance of the heads of the Military and Political Departments, of my Allied colleagues, and also of the Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss Army—General Ulrich Wille—and his Staff.

Based on the territorial system, the Swiss Army, in times of peace, possesses no officer of the rank of General; but on occasions of emergency, the appointment of a General as Commander-in-Chief is at once proceeded with. His choice finally rests with the Federal Assembly. The powers vested in him are of a very comprehensive nature; so comprehensive indeed during this war as to cause no little alarm among some sections of the community. In the emergency created by the declarations of war in August, 1914, the choice of a General Commander-in-Chief lay between Colonel Ulrich Wille, a citizen of the Canton of Zürich, married to a member of the Bismarck family, and Colonel Sprecher v. Bernegg, a citizen of the Canton of the Grisons, married to a member of the family of Von Bülow; and it was some time before the Government finally declared itself in favour of the former, appointing Colonel Sprecher v. Bernegg as his Chief of Staff.

With my Allied colleagues, Colonels Pageot, Gourko, and Golovane, the French and Russian Military Attachés, I maintained the most pleasant relations, and our mutual frank co-operation under sympathetic conditions will ever remain one of my most cherished memories. Colonel Gourko is the son of the Field Marshal Gourko (later Governor-General of Poland), of Shipka Pass fame. He had seen much active service, and is said to have received more wounds than any other officer in the Russian Army. Ever anxious to find himself in the trenches, he succeeded in returning to Russia in 1915, where he fought on several fronts until disabled by wounds, from which I am glad to know he again made a good recovery. Since the Revolution in Russia, he, like so many others, has given no sign of himself, and I have heard nothing further of him. Colonel Pageot returned to the Western Front in 1916, in command of a regiment, and greatly distinguished himself, receiving the "Croix de Guerre avec Palmes," a distinction which gave much pleasure to his former colleagues in Berne.

Prior to my departure from Thoune, I had been witness to the mobilization of the Swiss Army, and was much impressed by the smoothness with which that operation was conducted. There is nothing which touches more profoundly the life of each individual citizen than the exigencies of the defence of his country. Obligatory service has always been at the basis of the life of the Swiss people from the early dawn of their national history. The primitive cantons, even before 1290, were persuaded of the importance of a preparation for war, a persuasion which succeeding centuries have done much to develop and strengthen. The very first cantonal pacts laid stress on the dispositions regarding military organization, and as early as 1476, the Confederates placed contingents in the field numbering 50,000 fighting men.

The principle of universal service as adapted to present day requirements finds a willing acceptance amongst a people whose instincts, though ultra-democratic, make them realize that their independence rests on the attitude of the Confederation vis-à-vis of her powerful, and sometimes aggressive, neighbours. I have never in my experience of Switzerland heard a word of complaint of the burden borne by the State owing to the obligation entailed by universal service, though anger is deeply felt for the sacrifices imposed upon the country due to the ambitions of those responsible for the Great War.

On the outbreak of war the Confederation manifested their determination to maintain neutrality as against all comers, and, by the mobilization of some 300,000 men, made clear to the belligerents their strength of purpose.

The following table[1] gives a résumé of the gradual evolution of the military organization from the point of view of numbers legislated for at different periods:—

------+---------+----------+-----------+-------------------+------------ Year. | Elite. | Reserve. | Landwehr. | Landsturm | Total | | | | and Complementary | Effectives. | | | | Services. | ------+---------+----------+-----------+-------------------+------------ 1640 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 36,000 1782 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 63,697 1817 | 33,758 | 33,748 | -- | -- | 67,506 1850 | 69,569 | 34,785 | -- | -- | 104,354 1874 | 105,368 | -- | 97,012 | -- | 202,380 1899 | 148,435 | -- | 87,290 | 275,596 | 511,321 1911 | 142,054 | -- | 69,513 | 275,284 | 486,851 ------+---------+----------+-----------+-------------------+------------