Germany before the war — Text and Context

A Diplomat’s Accusation

Beyens does not pretend to objectivity. The introduction recalls the failed peace efforts of the Hague Conferences and private pacifists like Baron d’Estournelles de Constant, only to argue that Germany’s leadership never intended to abide by them. He writes that the “observance of these rules cannot be enforced by any court of justice, and depends entirely upon the honesty or good will of the Powers.” This framing sets up his central claim: that Germany’s rulers, from the Kaiser down, were bent on war. The catalog subject “World War, 1914-1918 – Causes” is thus addressed not through abstract analysis but through a prosecutor’s brief, built on Beyens’s own observations and the public record of German policy.

The Prussian School of History

One of the most distinctive sections of the excerpts is Beyens’s attack on German historiography. He traces a line from Niebuhr, Ranke, and Mommsen to Treitschke and Delbrück, arguing that the “Prussian school writes German history as if it were the development of a single idea” – the inevitable unification under Hohenzollern rule. Beyens claims this teaching instilled in generations of students a “thirst for blood” and an “implacable hatred of France and England.” He is careful to note that similar nationalism existed elsewhere, but insists that German universities uniquely directed historical criticism toward a political goal. This is not a neutral summary of intellectual history; it is a wartime polemic linking academic culture to military aggression.

The War’s Atavistic Face

Beyens devotes striking passages to what he sees as a reversion to barbarism. He describes German soldiers “rifling the invaded country, ransacking houses, great and small, from cellar to loft, organizing convoys of booty to be sent to Germany.” He calls this “atavism, as persistent as original sin.” The language is moral and visceral, far removed from the measured tone of diplomatic memoir. Beyens also accuses the German high command of ordering “no mercy” and of knowing that their troops would obey “to the letter.” These claims, made in 1916, reflect the contemporary propaganda about German atrocities in Belgium, but they also reveal the author’s emotional investment. The excerpts do not provide evidence for these accusations; they present them as established fact.

Readers should approach Germany before the War as a primary source of wartime opinion rather than a detached historical study. Beyens’s proximity to events and his personal stake as a Belgian diplomat give the book urgency but also bias. The catalog subjects list “World War, 1914-1918 – Causes” and “Germany – Foreign relations – 1871-1918,” but the excerpts show that Beyens is less interested in diplomatic chronology than in moral condemnation. For a fuller picture, pair this with works that examine German decision-making from other national perspectives.